Koney · Cyber Deception Policies for Kubernetes



The Honeynet Project Workshop 2025

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PRESENTER Mario Kahlhofer Dynatrace Research




CO-DEVELOPER

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APPLICATION LAYER CYBER DECEPTION Let's Embed Traps Directly Into Applications!





'Classic' honeypots are isolated fake applications, reachable over the network




Honeytokens & application layer deception techniques are traps embedded into applications & systems

APPLICATION LAYER CYBER DECEPTION Let's Embed Traps Directly Into Applications! (cont.)

- Place Honeytokens in (container) filesystems
- Add new HTTP endpoints to mislead hackers
- Modify HTTP headers, e.g., version numbers
- Modify HTTP bodies, e.g., hidden form fields
- Other (non-HTTP) methods




But software applications are rarely deployed by the team that wrote the code, and often the responsibility for security measures lies entirely elsewhere.




[2] M. Kahlhofer, M. Golinelli, and S. Rass, "Koney: A Cyber Deception Orchestration Framework for Kubernetes," 2025, arXiv: arXiv:2504.02431. doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2504.02431.

THE IDEA Automated Deployment of Cyber Deception "As Code"

... instead of manually deciphering cyber deception techniques from academic papers.




THE IDEA Cyber Deception Policy Documents



- Trap-specific parameterization
 - Criteria for selecting the workloads (e.g., containers) in which to deploy the traps

Decoy. [3] Strategy to deploy the trap itself
 Captor. [3] Strategy for monitoring the trap





LIVE DEMO

Applying a DeceptionPolicy With Koney



DECOY STRATEGY Placing Honeytokens by Executing Shell Commands





DECOY STRATEGY · SUMMARY Placing Honeytokens by Executing Shell Commands (cont.)

cat "secret" > /run/secrets/token

echo /run/secrets/token

rm /run/secrets/token

Deployment Verification Clean-Up

?

Monitoring of access attempts

Transparency for system operators

Zero Downtime

of application services


Non-interference

with genuine operation

✓ DeceptionPolicy

√ yes

 \checkmark just a few process executions



LIVE DEMO

Honeytoken File Access Monitoring






LIVE DEMO Koney Alert Example

```
alert.json
                                                                                        JSON
Ł
  "timestamp": "2025-06-02T11:17:02Z",
  "deception_policy_name": "deceptionpolicy-servicetoken",
  "trap_type": "filesystem_honeytoken",
  "metadata": { "file_path": "/run/secrets/koney/service_token" },
  "pod": {
    "name": "koney-demo-deployment-5bcbd78875-45qpn",
    "namespace": "koney-demo",
    "container": {
      "id": "docker://e19c1827e255ce7a5c5fd74eb4ee861388f83a16410effd65e30d3b051cd815f",
      "name": "nginx"
    }
  <u></u>, {
  "process": {
    "pid": 148373, "uid": 0, "cwd": "/", "binary": "/usr/bin/cat",
    "arguments": "/run/secrets/koney/service_token"
  }
}
```

CAPTOR STRATEGY File Access Monitoring with eBPF




eBPF makes the kernel programmable. eBPF programs are typically written in a subset of C or Rust and compiled to an object file.



CAPTOR STRATEGY File Access Monitoring with eBPF (cont.)



We hook the security_file_permissions kprobe in kernel space.



CAPTOR STRATEGY File Access Monitoring with eBPF (cont.)

5



YAML policy.yaml apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1 kind: TracingPolicy metadata: name: monitor-honeytoken spec: kprobes: - call: security_file_permission syscall: false return: true args: - index: 0 type: file - index: 1 type: int returnArg: index: 0 type: int returnArgAction: Post selectors: - matchArgs: - index: 0 operator: Prefix values: - /run/secrets/token



Tetragon is a Kubernetes Operator that simplifies the creation of "tracing policies" in K8s clusters.

Falco and Tracee are popular alternatives.



[5] K. Kourtis and A. Papagiannis, "File Monitoring with eBPF and Tetragon (Part 1)," Isovalent Blog. Accessed: Feb. 2025. [Online]. Available: https://isovalent.com/blog/post/file-monitoring-with-ebpf-and-tetragon-part-1/




LIVE DEMO

Applying a DeceptionPolicy With Koney to a Distroless Container Image



DECOY STRATEGY Placing Honeytokens by Mounting Volumes



DECOY STRATEGY · SUMMARY Placing Honeytokens With Koney

Strategy 1: Shell Commands

Deployment Verification Clean-Up

Monitoring of access attempts

Transparency for system operators

Zero Downtime of application services

Non-interference with genuine operation

cat "secret" > /run/secrets/token
echo /run/secrets/token
rm /run/secrets/token

√ eBPF (via Tetragon)

✓ DeceptionPolicy

√ yes

 \checkmark just a few process executions

Strategy 2: Volume Mounts

+spec.containers.volumeMounts
echo /run/secrets/token
-spec.containers.volumeMounts

√ eBPF (via Tetragon)

 \checkmark even better, visible manifest change

X needs container restart in Kubernetes

 \checkmark even better, no process executions

OUTLOOK Deceive. Test. Repeat.

We expect to speed up the cycle time between cyber deception design and deployment, and to help separate the responsibilities of **deception technology authors**, **software application developers**, and **system operators**.




Development Outlook

- Traps for HTTP-based applications
- eBPF Monitoring without Tetragon
- LLM-generated policy documents



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DECOY STRATEGY **Placing Honeytokens by Executing Shell Commands**