# Welcome to the Party, Pal?: How Die Hard Can Help Us Design Cyber Deception Influence Models Built on Signaling More Than Infrastructure


**Honeynet Workshop Prague 2 June 2025** 

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


### How does Die Hard help us understand deception and influence?

- The terrorist group manipulated the building's security controls and protocols using deception and influence
- Yes, NYPD Det. John McClane literally killed everyone; however, he was effective because he observed behaviors and exploited their behaviors and affect
- Det. McClane used deception to overcome the limitations of his movement and weapons, including their decision making and cognitive biases
- With each dead terrorist, Det. McClane instrumentally compounded ambiguity and uncertainty in Gruber
- Det. McClane's deception and influence was effective because it was consistent and engaging



#### A cyber deception experience that really shaped me



## Rare experiences in government and industry cyber deception

- Former FBI profiler, supporting adversary engagement operations and communication
- Design and create content supporting industry cyber deception





## Why are signaling or displays so important in cyber deception?

- Whaley was a communication researcher before he was a deception researcher
- Signaling contextualizes the "domain" costs and benefits
- · We don't want to keep waiting until an attacker gets inside







#### **Cyber deception influence model #1:**

## Introduce affective storylines and content that undermine attackers' trust and certainty

- The first dead terrorist had a brother terrorist, and they were afraid to tell him because of how he might react
- The terrorists who found him appeared shocked that someone had killed one
  of them, and appeared to have information about which floor they were on
- Gruber was interrupted from his plan and narrative:
  - "... We are in charge..."
- Gruber is contributing to the uncertainty and ambiguity:
  - "... A security guard we missed?... No, this is something else"



#### **Cyber deception influence model #1:**

## Introduce affective storylines and content that undermine attackers' trust and certainty

- There is a hierarchy to content sharing based on emotions and affect and humor
  - You can drive private and public content sharing.
- Inducing emotional or affective overload is an element to cognitive overload, and perhaps quicker and more effective
- This works for individuals online, but especially for groups or teams
- 'Hard targets' like hypervigilant attackers are some of the most vulnerable targets to distrust and "sinister attribution error"



#### Cyber deception influence model #2:

## Channel attackers' attention and sensemaking to reputational and performance stages

- Det. McClane uses the terrorists' own communication channel to talk to Gruber, but all the terrorists can hear this communication
- How Gruber responds perhaps changes
  - He expected the police response, but he did not expect Det. McClane
- Det. McClane mentions the deaths of various terrorists for the first time before Gruber and his terrorists can confirm those deaths, introducing further uncertainty and ambiguity
  - "How does he know so much about..."
- Det. McClaine misdirects the terrorists' priorities and time to confirm his claims





#### **Cyber deception influence model #2:**

## Channel attackers' attention and sensemaking to reputational and performance stages

- If you have their attention and can hold their attention, you can directly influence their sensemaking and next steps
- Sensemaking is like a filter, making sense of new information
  - These are aspects of reflexive control to manipulate this filter and manage attacker behaviors
- Injecting into their communication and pathways of information collection and processing can significantly influence them





#### Cyber deception influence model #3:

## Disrupt and influence attackers' storylines with your own powerful storyline

- The terrorists prepared to escalate if necessary and did escalate
- The law enforcement response was not prepared for this escalation and was generally unable to do much from outside the building
- Det. McClane disrupted that escalation with an escalated response, using the terrorists' C4 explosives
  - "It's not the police...it's him"
- The local news media were present throughout the event, providing <u>live</u> coverage





#### **Cyber deception influence model #3:**

## Disrupt and influence attackers' storylines with your own powerful storyline

- Privileged moments of vulnerability can influence attackers and law enforcement response if revealed publicly
- You should not depend on law enforcement assistance during an event
- Attackers may prepare for law enforcement response or be familiar with law enforcement response, but they will struggle to anticipate how you will respond once you violate their expectations
- Using an attackers' tools and techniques in response just short of 'hacking back' can cause confusion and uncertainty
- There are other real and imagined stories you can tell powerfully



#### **Discussion**

- These cyber deception influence models can be demonstrated by anyone, regardless of level of training or experience.
  - This is not 'hacking back', but it is a response.
- The psychological underpinning of each cyber deception influence model reflects attackers' behavioral responses.
  - Communication incorporating those underpinnings can effectively signal or display these cyber deception influence models in most contexts.
  - It costs little, too.



#### **Discussion**

- These cyber deception influence models can practically or instrumentally augment any existing deception infrastructure and network defense enterprise practices.
  - These influence models also reflect operational research into effective deception online.
- Even in the absence of any deception COTS or deception infrastructure, cyber deception influence models can still misdirect or deter attackers.





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